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Abstract 
Subsidising research networks has become a popular instrument in 
technology policies, driven mainly by expected positive spillovers. In 
particular, the stimulation of R&D co-operation between scientific 
institutions and industry is considered as most promising. In the 
context of policy evaluation we analyse if public R&D funding is 
suitable for influencing firms’ collaborative behaviour in the intended 
way and where applicable, if a lasting change results. The empirical 
analysis is based on German CIS data and a supplemental telephone 
survey. Using a nearest-neighbour matching approach we find that 
R&D funding is indeed a particularly valuable tool for the linking of 
science into industry R&D partnerships. However, we also show in a 
bivariate probit analysis that newly initiated R&D co-operations with 
science are less likely to be continued after funding has ended 
compared to already existing co-operations. Therefore, the 
behavioural change induced by public funding is not necessarily long-
lived. 
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Non-technical summary 
Public funding of research and development (R&D) activities is an integral function of 
innovation policies implemented by the governments of most OECD countries. Its primary 
objective is to increase the innovative potential and competitiveness of the respective 
economy. In Germany, direct R&D project funding is an important funding tool used by the 
government. Since the end of the 1980s a clear trend towards the funding of projects 
conducted in networks rather than individual companies can be observed. In 2004 two-thirds 
of all directly funded projects were part of a collaborative network.  
In the face of shrinking government budgets and intensified international competition 
in the field of technology, increasing the efficiency of innovation policies has become crucial. 
Hence, evaluations have shifted into focus for politicians and economists.  
Within the framework of evaluation approaches, the present study aims to investigate 
behavioural additionality effects with the focus on collaboration, i.e. changes in firms’ 
behaviour in terms of co-operation arising from publicly funded R&D projects. We ask 
whether public R&D funding is adequate for influencing firms’ collaborative behaviour. The 
data used in the empirical analysis is based on the Mannheim Innovation Survey database, the 
German Federal Government's R&D funding database, the German Patent Office database 
and telephone interview survey data. We examine 659 German firms involved in R&D 
collaboration and investigate (i) whether public R&D funding stimulates firms to collaborate 
with a different set of partners (business firms, scientific institutions or both) compared to 
where public funding has not been received and by means of 142 observations (ii) whether 
newly initiated collaborations within a publicly funded R&D project are likely to last 
compared to already existing collaborations, after public funding has ended. 
Our first research question is: can public R&D funding be used as a trigger for 
involving new types of partners in a co-operation? To examine this effect, we characterise 
R&D partnerships as business-only, science-only and as involving the combination of both 
business and science partners. Within a nearest-neighbour matching approach, we compare 
the resulting sets of R&D collaborations between publicly-funded and non-publicly-funded 
firms.  In a second step using a bivariate probit analysis we investigate if a potential change 
lasts and ask: are newly initiated co-operations more likely, or at least as likely, to be 
continued compared to already existing co-operations?  
We find that public R&D funding is, in particular, a means of stimulating the inclusion 
of science as a new partner in industry R&D partnerships. In this respect, i.e. stimulating new 
and more diversified types of partnerships, public funding achieves its aim. However, we also 
show that newly initiated industry-science R&D co-operations are less likely to be continued 
after funding has ended compared to already existing co-operations. Overall, public funding 
tends to integrate science into business R&D partnerships, but these newly-established 
networks are not necessarily continued after funding has ended. 
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1 Introduction 
Public funding of research and development (R&D) activities is an integral function of 
innovation policies implemented by the governments of most OECD countries. Its primary 
objective is to increase the innovative potential and competitiveness of the respective 
economy. In the face of shrinking government budgets and intensified international 
competition in the field of technology, increasing the efficiency of innovation policies has 
become crucial (OECD 2004a). Hence, there is growing demand for rigorous evaluation of 
R&D policies to form the basis of national learning processes and sound decision-making by 
policy makers and participants. Evaluations of R&D incentive schemes are of particular 
importance in judging the impact and effects of such governmental interventions. The impetus 
behind the popularity of evaluation approaches is linked to growing expectations of achieving 
additional sustainable returns on public investments, denoted by the term ‘additionality’. 
Evaluations are broadly defined as systematic and objective assessments of on-going 
or completed projects, programmes or policies with respect to design, implementation and 
results. Their primary concern is to shed light on the key criteria of efficiency, effectiveness, 
impact and sustainability, as policy makers and, in the end, taxpayers inquire about the 
additionality effects which may result from a policy measure (OECD 2001). Concepts of 
measuring additionality deal with the question of how policies have affected the current 
situation or performance of participating agents or sometimes even of the entire economy. 
Assessing the effects of public funding, empirical studies have focused almost exclusively on 
additionalities regarding firms’ input, e.g. supplementary R&D investments, and companies’ 
output, e.g. increasing patent applications (cf. David et al. 2000, Czarnitzki et al. 2004). But 
changes of firm’s behaviour throughout the R&D process, e.g. regarding the organization or 
strategy of R&D, might also be induced by public funding. These changes are called 
‘behavioural additionality’ effects.  
This study looks at national R&D funding of private businesses in Germany and 
investigates behavioural additionality effects, thereby focussing on changes regarding 
collaborative behaviour. We ask whether public R&D project funding is adequate for 
influencing firms’ co-operation practices in Germany. In particular, we investigate different 
types of collaborative research due to public R&D funding. The question on which we intend 
to shed light is whether public R&D funding stimulates firms to participate in new kinds of 
R&D co-operation, especially in co-operations with scientific institutions (science), which 
results in more diversified co-operation. Moreover, we examine if within a publicly funded 
R&D project newly initiated collaborations, i.e. cases where a company collaborated with the 
partner for the first time, are as likely or even more likely to last compared to already existing 
co-operations, after public funding has ended. If newly initiated co-operations are continued 
after the funded project has ended, a sustainable change in firms’ collaborative behaviour is 
achieved through public funding. 
The structure of the remainder of the paper is as follows: First, we give a brief 
overview of economic theory and the rationale for public funding of business R&D. In the 
third section we analyse the change witnessed in the German Federal Government’s funding 
policy during the 1980s and 1990s. Section four presents the evaluation concept and research 
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questions. In the empirical section we describe the data and the econometrics applied, 
followed by a presentation of the results. Finally, section seven concludes. 
2 Rationales for collaborative R&D funding 
For a better understanding of the rationales for collaborative R&D funding, we 
describe first shortly the distinctive features of R&D and secondly we outline the impact of 
these unique characteristics of R&D on the firms’ decision to engage in R&D co-operations.  
Characteristics of R&D 
Starting with Arrow's (1962) work, economists have realised that investment in R&D 
differs substantially from other types of investment, e.g., in physical assets. R&D consists of 
knowledge, which has characteristics typical of a public good (Coase 1974). Unlike 
investment in physical assets, returns on the creation of knowledge cannot be fully 
appropriated by the inventor. In the business sector such knowledge leaks out of the firm, e.g., 
by employees leaving the company. Thus, competitors benefit from the inventor and original 
investor’s efforts. The evidence of significant spillovers of private investments in the field of 
R&D and innovation is shown by a host of empirical analyses (cf. OECD 2004b, Klette et al. 
2000, Jones 1998). Due to these externalities, economists recognise the two sides of R&D as a 
rather general problem: Leaking knowledge increases social returns but reduces private 
returns and prevents R&D activity in the long run. In the case that R&D could possibly 
generate high social returns without covering the private cost, market failure occurs and the 
level of R&D activities in the economy in question is thus below the socially desirable level 
(cf. Levin et al. 1987, Adams/Jaffe 1996, Mathews 1996).  
Furthermore, the inherent risk of failure associated with each R&D project leads to the 
fact that potential investors are reluctant to finance such investments, since they have less 
information about the expected returns than the firm. Additionally, the financing of R&D is 
more difficult than other types of investment due to its intangible character. Often, it does not 
offer any collateral in credit negotiations. Thus, the level of R&D in the economy decreases 
even further. 
Explanations of R&D collaborations 
Since R&D is of great importance for firms, they have to find a way to overcome or at 
least to mitigate the inherent obstacles to R&D. One answer for firms is to engage in R&D 
collaborations. The number of R&D partnerships has increased considerably since the 
beginning of the 1980s and nowadays co-operation is a widely used form of organizing R&D 
(Hagedoorn 2002). In R&D co-operations the level of voluntary knowledge flow can be 
determined by the R&D partners since they can decide on how much knowledge they 
exchange. The result is that via R&D co-operations, firms achieve both a high level of 
knowledge flow into a firm and sufficiently protect internal knowledge from leaking out. 
Besides the motives related to knowledge spillover, other factors influencing a firm’s 
decision to cooperate can be identified. They can be mainly categorized into two groups: (1) 
overcoming resource constraints a firm faces, e.g. constraints in terms of knowledge, 
competencies and financial means which hamper firms from undertaking innovation projects 
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on their own and (2) determinants related to firm characteristics, e.g. structure of the firm and 
industry in which it operates, e.g. many studies show that the probability of co-operation 
increases with firm size.2 
The motives, mechanisms and benefits of research consortia emerge from different 
theories and empirical studies. The theoretical explanations are mainly based on three 
perspectives: (a) transaction cost theory, (b) strategic management theory and (c) industrial 
organisation theory.3 In transaction cost theory, R&D co-operations are explained as a hybrid 
form of organisation between a market and a hierarchy, to facilitate an activity specifically 
related to the production and dissemination of technological knowledge. Due to the lacking 
appropriability of R&D, positive external effects are generated. In order to internalise such 
effects, companies prefer to engage in research collaborations with possible third party users 
of their research results. In strategic management theory, research partnerships are explained 
by competitive reasoning (jointly defending market positions against competitors), by 
strategic networks (economies of scale and scope), by a resource based view of the firm (to 
exploit unique capabilities), by dynamic capabilities (to combine competencies) and by 
strategic options on new technologies (to determine resources for superior future 
performance). In the theory of industrial organisation, research collaborations are explained 
by the existence of market failures due to the perceived nature of knowledge as a public good. 
The majority of theoretical studies deal with imperfectly appropriable R&D and an increase 
of market power (e.g. Katz 1986, d’Aspremont/Jacquemin 1988, Freeman 1991, Kamien et al.  
1992, Katsoulacos/Ulph 1998, Robertson/Gatignon 1998, Kamien/Zang 2000). Empirical 
studies dealing with incentives to engage in R&D co-operations are e.g. Cassiman/Veugelers 
2002 and Belderbos et al. 2004a. 
Public funding and R&D collaborations 
To overcome market failures related to the R&D investments of firms, governments 
also take action and use a variety of policies, so that technology gaps can be avoided and, in 
the end, national and European competitiveness is strengthened (Fahrenkrog et al. 2002, 
Branscomb/Florida 1997, Martin/Scott 2000). In OECD countries four main policy 
instruments are used for this purpose: (1) establishment of public research infrastructure, e.g. 
public laboratories, (2) government funding of R&D performed by businesses, e.g. public 
subsidies for specific R&D projects, (3) fiscal incentives like tax deductions for R&D 
expenditure and (4) property rights, e.g. governments compensate for market failure by using 
property rights to protect knowledge which has been exclusively paid for and generated by a 
firm. Today, many countries have implemented a mix of these policy tools to foster domestic 
innovation performance (Capron/van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie 1997). 
In Germany, a complex system of public R&D funding was established in the 1970s. 
Public funding schemes are employed in all areas of industry and technology. Today, the 
German research system is generally financed through targeted, short- to medium-term 
funding of R&D projects and through medium- or long-term basic funding of institutional 
                                                 
2 Further theoretical arguments concerning questions related to research partnerships can be found in, 
e.g.Vonortas (1997) or de la Mothe/Link (2002); for a survey see Caloghirou et al. (2003). 
3 See Hagedoorn et al. (2000) for a detailed overview. 
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research. In international comparison, the German R&D policy stands out mainly by its lack 
of supportive fiscal measures. In Germany subsidies for R&D projects have become a popular 
instrument in technology policies, from the 1980s on. At the federal level, direct R&D project 
funding for industry is almost exclusively provided by the Federal Ministry of Education and 
Research (BMBF) and the Federal Ministry of Economics and Labour (BMWA).  
In line with theory, the German Federal Government justifies its public R&D funding 
with the existence of external effects, i.e., that third parties can use research results and thus 
gain an economic advantage without paying the technology developer a fee. “In such cases 
the incentives may be too weak for innovative companies to develop private R&D activities in 
these areas to the desirable extent if economic profitability considerations were included” 
(BMBF 1993). The purpose of such funding is to achieve high international standards of 
performance in selected areas of research and development in order to stay competitive in the 
end (BMBF 2002). 
At the end of the 1980s when R&D co-operation was seen as a useful form of R&D 
organization, the German government decided to reconfigure the incentive structure towards 
R&D collaborations. They want to phase out such former policies which relied on project-
specific funding of single awardees and advance a collaboration-oriented policy scheme with 
the goal of allowing spillovers. This has been addressed, in particular, at small and medium 
sized enterprises (SMEs) and scientific research. The main objective associated with this 
policy change is to increase public funding efficiency. The further argumentation in funding 
collaborative R&D projects runs along the line of spillovers and the desired know-how 
transfer: “Collaborative R&D intends to involve as many companies and scientific 
organisations as possible within a publicly funded project, to bundle individual resources and 
capabilities, to stimulate the technology transfer between industry and science, and to achieve 
synergies while funding should get less selective but more diffusive” (BMBF 1988, BTDrs 
2005). The aim is to achieve a widespread efficiency of public R&D funds by stimulating 
“multidisciplinary R&D collaborations e.g. between social-, natural- and engineering 
scientists” (BMBF 2004) and “heterogeneous R&D collaborations e.g. between industry and 
science” (BTDrs 2005).  
3 Facts and figures on public R&D project funding in Germany 
In Germany, direct R&D project funding is an important funding tool for the 
government. It is characterised by the funding of a concrete field of technology on a cost-
sharing basis. In principle, such business R&D project funding is available to all domestic 
firms. However, each public R&D programme has specific characteristics, such as different 
application procedures, different requirements and different agencies which are responsible 
for funding proceedings. These agencies assist the federal ministries in funding concepts, 
advise potential applicants seeking support for research and offer consulting with respect to 
the exploitation of patents and licences (BMBF 2004). 
The importance of direct R&D funding to the business sector is revealed by the 
number of funded companies and projects and the total amount of these grants. In the 1980s, 
an average of 1,623 projects per year were funded with an average amount of 394 million 
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euro (cf. Table 1).4 The indicators show different changes in the following decades. The 
number of publicly funded projects steadily increased up to 4,080 projects in 2004. The 
number of funded companies more than tripled from 1980 to 2004. 
The Federal Government’s total R&D budget available for spending on firms did not 
grow proportionally with the increase in awarded projects. Rather, the total R&D budget and 
therefore the average award size have been decreasing at the same time. The average total 
awarded to private firms in the 1980s stood at 394 millions euros; in 2004 the amount was 
about 363 millions euros (-8 %). This means that more than twice as many projects and three 
times as many firms were funded with less money. Consequently, the average award size for 
R&D projects has decreased from 242,000 euros in the 1980s to its present low of 89,000 
euros in 2004. Furthermore, a shift took place regarding how the money was divided among 
the different technology areas. While the relative amount granted for projects in the areas of 
the environment, energy and transportation decreased in that time period, it was primarily the 
ICT sector which became more important. About 46 per cent of the funding budgets are 
allocated to projects of the ICT sector in 2004. 
Table 1: Statistics on direct R&D project funding for the business sector  
by the BMBF (1980-2004) 
  1980-89a) 1990-99 a) 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004b)  
Total number of funded projects 1,623 2,264 3,469 3,876 4,072 4,086 4,080 
Number of individually conducted projects 1,171 586 644 628 538 520 527 
Number of collaboratively conducted projects 452 1,679 2,825 3,248 3,534 3,566 3,553 
Per cent of indiv. conducted projects 72.2 25.9 18.6 16.2 13.2 12.7 12.9 
Per cent of collab. conducted projects 27.8 74.1 81.4 83.8 86.8 87.3 87.1 
Avg. number of participants in collaborations 3.3 3.2 3.3 3.3 3.2 3.1 3.0 
Total R&D budget committed (mio. €) 393.7 318.1 395.6 414.9 397.8 380.9 362.9 
Budget committed to indiv. conducted projects (mio. €) 267.2 104.4 114.2 114.2 98.7 94.5 79.4 
Budget committed to collab. conducted projects (mio. €) 126.5 213.7 281.4 300.7 299.0 286.4 283.6 
Avg. grant size for indiv. conducted projects (mio. €) 0.225 0.185 0.177 0.182 0.183 0.182 0.151 
Avg. grant size for collab. conducted projects (mio. €)c) 0.334 0.136 0.100 0.093 0.085 0.080 0.080 
 
Legend: a) Figures represent the average on a yearly basis; b) preliminary numbers; c) Basis: single collaborative project 
Source: BMBF PROFI database (2005), calculations by ZEW; 1980 to 1989: West-Germany;  
 without contract research and R&D projects funded at 100 per cent; 
 Deflated time series amounts (1995=100). 
 
 
At the end of the 1980s, the BMBF began to emphasise the funding of projects 
conducted by networks rather than individual companies which can be confirmed by the 
distribution of the number of funded projects and funding amounts. While in the 1980s about 
72 per cent of all funded projects in the business sector were individual R&D projects, the 
opposite was true by beginning of 2000, with a proportion of 81 per cent of projects 
conducted on a collaborative basis (cf. Table 1). Currently, about 87 per cent of all publicly 
funded projects of the business sector are collaborative R&D projects and these receive 78 per 
cent of the funding budget. Looking at the respective project size, it appears that presently a 
                                                 
4 Contract research and projects which are funded by 100 per cent are not taken into account. 
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typical individually conducted project is smaller by a quarter than the total amount of joint 
R&D projects, taking the sum of all the projects belonging to one network. But a single 
project of one co-operation partner is only about half the size of an overall individually 
conducted project. This is because these joint research activities where business companies 
are involved are carried out by an average of three partners, such as other firms or scientific 
institutions. In 2004, the largest of these networks was composed of 34 partners.  
The BMBF did not only intend to emphasize collaborative R&D in general, but they 
wanted to fund more diversified co-operations with respect to the type of participating 
partners. Figure 1 graphs all publicly funded projects, not restricted to the business sector, 
according to whether they are part of a network and, if so, which kinds of partners are 
involved.5  
Figure 1: Direct R&D project funding by BMBF in Germany 
(1980 – 2004)  
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Source: Calculation by ZEW based on the German Federal Government’s database PROFI (2005)6 
Looking at all directly funded projects the clear trend towards collaborative projects 
remains. While in 1980 almost all of the funded projects were conducted by individual 
companies, the proportion of projects conducted in collaboration with two or more companies 
rose steadily. In 2004 two-thirds of the projects were part of a network. The increase thereby 
applies to all types of collaborations, i.e., any combination of business networks and research 
institutes/universities, but it is by far the largest for networks of business companies and 
                                                 
5 Firms are differentiated between business sector, science sector, like universities or research institutions, and 
other institutions (“others”), e.g. federal state ministries, municipal authorities, or chambers of commerce. 
6 Numbers are not restricted to the business sector. The eye-catching peak in the number of individually 
conducted projects between 1985 and 1987 is due to the funding program for improving vocational training for 
disadvantaged young persons.  
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scientific institutions. Most of the collaborative projects in which business companies take 
part also involve scientific institutions. Hence, the government implemented its plan to shift 
funding towards diversified co-operations.  
4 Investigating ‘additionalities’ 
In line with the trend towards controlling and planning strategies in R&D policy, the 
demand for evaluations of the implemented technology policies has grown. Evaluation 
processes help to assess the efficiency and effectiveness of political intervention by offering 
new insights into the impact of policies. 
It is evident that in terms of measuring the success of a policy measure, different 
indicators may be applied depending on different perspectives. Policy makers may see high 
numbers of participants as a success indicator, firms may primarily view profits as an 
indicator of success and consumers may judge success according to novelty and the prices of 
the available products. Nevertheless, these measures all illustrate that an additional effect, 
called ‘additionality’, is usually expected. The additionality concept has been more recently 
used in evaluations specifically to analyse public R&D grants on the firm level. Empirical 
examinations of additional effects are based on quantitative database information.  
The measurement of additionality can be systematised into three concepts: (i) input 
additionality, (ii) output additionality and (iii) behavioural additionality. Input additionality 
looks at firm’s inputs, e.g. private R&D investments, and may be characterised by the 
question: Do public R&D funds foster ‘inputs’ related to business R&D resources? This 
input-related concept analyses whether public R&D grants (partly) substitute or complement 
private R&D investment.7 This question has been studied in several OECD countries, using 
matching grants to qualify government-industry co-financing of R&D projects in the business 
sector. The concept of output additionality does not focus on changes in a firm's R&D 
spending, but instead analyses the ‘output’ of the firm’s innovation process, like new products 
or patents, after carrying out publicly and privately co-financed R&D. It analyses whether 
public R&D grants contribute to the outcome of firms’ R&D processes (see e.g. 
Branstetter/Sakakibara 2002 and Czarnitzki et al. 2004) 
The concept of behavioural additionality is the newest one of the three and was first 
introduced by Buisseret et al. (1995), who broadened the traditional additionality concept by 
claiming that “companies and institutions undertaking publicly sponsored projects are rarely 
left unchanged by the experience”. This concept can be defined as “the change in a 
company’s way of undertaking R&D which can be attributed to policy actions” (Buisseret et 
al. 1995). Public funding might induce changes of firm’s behaviour regarding the organization 
or strategy of R&D, e.g. companies redesign their long-term research strategies or their R&D 
management due to the publicly funded R&D project. It provides more detailed insight into 
operational modes, know-how diffusion and appropriability, sustainability of R&D projects 
and financial issues (Georghiou/Roessner 2000).  
                                                 
7  David et al. (2000) survey microeconomic and macroeconomic studies on this topic. More recent studies are, 
for example, Wallsten (2000), Lach (2002) and Almus/Czarnitzki (2003). 
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One specific aspect of firms’ R&D behaviour is the firms’ collaborative R&D 
activities. A firm decides whether to cooperate in R&D at all, and if so, with which type of 
partner. The collaboration strategy is influenced potentially by public funding. Firms might be 
encouraged by public funding to extend their already existing co-operations or to enter co-
operations with new (types of) partners.8  
Most of the empirical evaluation studies to date focus on input and output 
additionalities and thus neglect behavioural changes in general and also with respect to 
collaborative aspects due to public funding. Sakakibara (2001) analysed Japanese 
government-sponsored R&D consortia over 13 years and found evidence that the diversity of 
a consortium is associated with greater R&D expenditure by the participating firms. Overall, 
the results provide support for spillover effects. The magnitude of the effect of participation in 
an R&D consortium on firm R&D expenditure is found to be nine per cent, on average. 
Branstetter/Sakakibara (2002) examine the impact of government-sponsored research 
consortia on the research productivity in Japan by measuring their patenting activities over 
time. They find evidence that participants in research consortia tend to increase their patenting 
after entering a consortium, which is interpreted as evidence for spillovers. The marginal 
increase of participants’ patenting in targeted technologies, relatively to the control firms, is 
large and statistically significant. Hall et al. (2003) seek a better understanding of the 
performance of university-industry partnerships by surveying a sample of pre-commercial 
research projects which were funded by the U.S. government’s Advanced Technology 
Program.  
Feldman/Kelley (2001) find in a multivariate regression analysis that award-winning 
companies are already better linked to other business at the time of applying for an award than 
those not awarded and are more likely to have an important new R&D partner on the project. 
Other empirical studies have been based on case studies, or on the account of a few highly 
publicized co-operative R&D projects which are not representative (David et al. (2000), 
Wallsten (2000), Busom (2000), Lach (2002)) .  
The study presented here focuses on firms’ behaviour regarding co-operations in 
publicly funded R&D projects, thereby adding to the discourse on the restructuring of public 
R&D funding in Germany. We ask whether its most important tool, public R&D project 
funding, is adequate for influencing firms’ collaborative behaviour. We thus link co-operation 
into the concept of behavioural additionality: 
• Our first hypothesis is that public R&D funding stimulates firms to seek new types of 
R&D partners, i.e., public funding is suitable for fostering a change of firms’ cooperative 
behaviour towards a more diversified set of partners. For example, let’s say a company 
already cooperates in R&D with its suppliers and customers. We investigate if public 
funding supports these already existing instances of co-operation or if collaborative R&D 
funding gives incentives for firms to get involved in new types of partnerships, in 
particular multidisciplinary R&D collaborations. For this purpose we compare the type of 
co-operation partners of funded and non-funded firms. As regards this matter, the 
                                                 
8 Regarding the empirical literature dealing with co-operation, the main focus is on the decision to cooperate in 
general, or with specific types of partners, and the impact of co-operation on firms’ performance, e.g., 
Kleinknecht/Reijnen 1992, Cassiman/Veugelers 2002, Tether 2002, Cincera et al. 2003, Belderbos et al. 2004b. 
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government’s rationale in subsidising R&D co-operation between industry and science is 
to improve the transfer and application of technologies and scientific knowledge, e.g., via 
the exchange of expertise among performers, and to stimulate and support innovations and 
patent activities. 
• In the second hypothesis we examine firms’ characteristics in terms of the continuation of 
joint R&D once public funding has ended, that is, we test whether business or science 
collaborations newly initiated within a publicly funded R&D project are lasting. The 
government’s expectation is that firms change attitudes and behaviour by discovering 
valuable assets in R&D co-operation. Hence, companies overcome their prior reservations 
to partnering in their strategic field of R&D and maintain collaborative activities. On the 
other hand, newly initiated co-operations might bear a higher risk of failure due to 
differing expectations regarding the project outcome or of the - previously unknown - 
project partner. In order to evaluate the proportion of co-operation which were newly 
initiated and continued after funding has ended, we compare these with the continuation 
of already existing co-operations. If the funding has a longer term effect, the newly 
initiated co-operations should have a higher or at least the same probability of being 
continued after funding ends compared to co-operations which already existed before 
funding.  
5 Empirical model, data and descriptive statistics 
5.1 Methodology 
In this section, microeconometric analyses of firms’ collaborative behaviour are 
conducted in order to investigate (a) whether public R&D funding is suitable for fostering a 
change of firms’ usual R&D partnerships and (b) whether newly initiated collaborations 
within a publicly funded R&D project are continued even if public funding has ended. 
(a) Changes of firms’ R&D partnerships due to public funding 
To examine the first effect, i.e. the involvement of new types of partners in 
cooperative activities due to public funding, we will compare two groups of firms that 
collaborate in R&D. We distinguish firms without public funding from those which receive 
funds and investigate their R&D partnerships. In accordance with a distinction in the German 
public funding procedures we analyse firms by R&D collaborations with (i) other businesses 
only, (ii) with scientific institutions (“science”) only and (iii) by their involvement of a 
combination of both business and science. Policy makers aim to induce changes in 
collaborative behaviour through public funding. Explicitly, public funding is expected to 
provide a stimulus for increasing the probability of R&D co-operation in new and more 
heterogenous R&D combinations: companies which have previously cooperated solely in 
R&D with other firms, e.g., clients and/or suppliers, should gain incentives for involvement in 
more heterogeneous partnerships, i.e. co-operations with both other businesses and science. 
Germany’s public funding schemes favour collaborative research projects in general but do 
not predetermine the type of partner. Since public R&D funding is a cost-sharing approach it 
reduces firms’ R&D costs. But it has to be questioned whether a significant changes in the 
collaborative behaviour towards more heterogeneous kinds of partnerships is induced. 
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In order to correct for a possible selection bias, which occurs when participants in 
public measures differ from non-participants in important characteristics, we apply a non-
parametric matching procedure (cf. Heckman et al. 1999). With this approach we directly 
address the question, "With which set of partners would a funded firm with a given set of 
characteristics have cooperated, if it hadn’t had a funded project?” The participation in a 
publicly funded R&D project is also called treatment. We investigate the potential change of 
collaborative behaviour that may arise from public funding. Our sample exclusively contains 
R&D collaborating firms, of which we are able to distinguish whether they are subsidised or 
not subsidised. The matching estimator balances the sample individually for each observation 
with respect to the variables included in the matching procedure. The fundamental evaluation 
question can be illustrated by an equation describing the average treatment effect of treatment 
on the treated (ATT): 
 ( ) ( )| 1 | 1= = − =T CATT E Y S E Y S , 
where YT is the outcome variable, that indicates with which partner(s) the firm cooperates, 
namely, only with other businesses, only with science or with both types. The status S refers 
to the group: S=1 is the treatment group (subsidised firms) and S=0 the non-treated firms 
(non-subsidised firms). YC is the potential outcome which would have been realised if the 
treatment group (S=1) had not been treated. The problem is obvious: While the outcome of 
the treated firms in case of treatment, E(YT|S=1), is directly observable, this is not the case for 
the second term on the right side of the equation. With whom would these firms have 
collaborated if they had not received the treatment, i.e. the public funding? E(YC|S=1) is a 
counterfactual situation which is not observable and, therefore, has to be estimated. In the 
case of matching, this potential outcome is constructed from a control group of non-
participants (collaborating and not publicly funded firms). The matching relies on the 
intuitively attractive idea of balancing the sample of program participants with comparable 
non-participants. Remaining differences in the outcome variables, the sets of co-operation 
partners, between both groups are then attributed to the treatment, i.e. the public direct R&D 
project funding (Heckman et al. 1997). 
In order that the ATT can be identified two assumptions have to hold: the Conditional 
Independence Assumption (CIA) and common support. The CIA implies that all the 
characteristics which influence both treatment and outcome have to be observed. Common 
support ensures that for each treated observation a similar control can be found. 
(b) Continuation of firms’ new R&D partnerships even if public funding ends 
What happens with an R&D partnership when public funding ends? The predominant 
question is whether the partners continue to collaborate or if the established network 
dissolves. Thereby, we pay special attention to newly initiated collaborations in order to 
evaluate if public funding has a longer term effect on the co-operation behaviour. Does co-
operation that was established for the funded project last after public funding has ended? 
Collaboration need not be restricted to the funded project period; instead, companies could 
continue joint activity, e.g., in the same or another project. They might especially decide to do 
so in cases where the companies considered the funding and co-operation as valuable 
(Hypothesis 1).  
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A proportion of the funded projects are continued after funding has ended. In order to 
evaluate this proportion we compare the newly initiated co-operations, which represent a 
behavioural change due to the funding, with those that already existed. Due to potential 
heterogeneity among firms, technologies or funds, we apply a multivariate approach, namely 
a bivariate probit model9, to test the hypothesis. This enables us to control for effects of 
several variables in our analysis. Accordingly, we simultaneously estimate the likelihood of 
the continuation of co-operation with science and co-operation with business. On the basis of 
the estimation results we check whether the variable for the newly initiated co-operation has a 
significant impact on the continuation of the R&D partnerships (Hypothesis 2).  
5.2 Data and telephone survey 
The company data used in the following empirical analysis is based on the Mannheim 
Innovation Panel (MIP), the German Federal Government's direct R&D funding database 
(PROFI), the German Patent Office database (DPMA) and Computer Aided Telephone 
Interview (CATI) data. 
In an initial step we use data from the Mannheim Innovation Panel (MIP), an annual 
innovation survey conducted by the Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW) on 
behalf of the BMBF since 1993. The 2001 survey represents the German part of the third 
Community Innovation Survey. The data cover the manufacturing sector and selected service 
sectors. We use the 2001 and 2004 waves of the MIP as they are the only ones to contain data 
on R&D co-operations and funding. This means the surveyed information corresponds to the 
years 2000 and 2003 or to the period 1998-2000 and 2001-2003, depending on the specific 
variable. Because the analysis deals with behavioural changes concerning R&D co-operation, 
we only use firms which maintain R&D co-operation. The question on co-operation relates to 
the preceding three year period. On top of that, the firms have to name the type of their co-
operation partners. Since only the innovative firms were asked the questions on co-operation 
our sample is restricted to firms with innovative activities. In order to achieve valid results, 
we decided to limit our sample to manufacturing firms and, moreover, to companies with less 
than 5,000 employees.10 In a second step, we merge this firm level data with the Federal 
Government's R&D funding database (PROFI). This database contains all federal civilian 
direct R&D funding activities carried out in Germany by the BMBF or its former ministries 
since the 1970s. In a third step, we extract information on patents from the German Patent 
Office (DPMA) database which covers patenting activities in Germany since 1980. As both 
the DPMA and the PROFI databases are census data, our sample is determined by the MIP. In 
the end, we have 659 German firms to be used for the estimations. 
In addition, data from the telephone survey on behavioural patterns were used. For the 
survey cases from the PROFI database where the publicly funded R&D projects expired 
between 2002 and 2004 were selected. This time period guarantees a higher probability of 
contacting the responsible R&D managers involved in the R&D funding and implementation 
                                                 
9 For a description of bivariate probit models see, e.g., Greene (2003). 
10 As the matching relies on the idea of comparing similar observations, we decided to restrict the sample to 
companies with less than 5,000 employees because it is not very meaningful to look for similar firms when they 
are larger than this threshold. 
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process. The telephone interview was structured in four different thematic fields related to the 
dimensions of behavioural additionality.11 For the behavioural assessment of the impact of 
publicly funded R&D projects on collaborations, the interviewees were asked about their 
status of co-operation with respect to public funding. The telephone survey was conducted 
with the CATI system because of its high flexibility in reporting interviews and higher 
response rates compared to mail surveys. Finally, we collected a pool of 1,891 unique 
companies, of which 524 were selected randomly to be surveyed. Every selected company 
was called on average 2.6 times for different reasons, such as the responsible R&D project 
manager being unavailable. In summary, 39 per cent of the R&D managers contacted 
participated in the survey and a full set of data is available for 142 firms. 
5.3 Variables and descriptive statistics 
On the basis of the MIP data, 659 collaborative R&D performers are identified. We 
differentiate between three kinds of R&D partnerships on the basis of the type of co-
operation, to examine our first hypothesis:  
(i) Business-Business co-operation (BCOP): a firm collaborates only with other businesses,  
(ii) Business-Science co-operation (SCOP): a firm collaborates only with scientific 
institutions,  
(iii) Business-Science & Business co-operation (SBCOP): a firm collaborates with other 
businesses and scientific institutions.  
The descriptive statistics of the firms show that the majority (57%) of these companies 
participate in multidisciplinary co-operations, the business-science & business (SBCOP) co-
operation (Table 2). About 24 per cent of all firms only cooperate with science (SCOP) and 
about 19 per cent have partnerships only with business (BCOP). Furthermore, we distinguish 
the collaborating firms into recipients of public R&D funds (during the preceding three year 
period) and companies who cooperate in R&D without public funding. Collaborating 
recipients of public R&D funding are labelled by a dummy variable (FUND). In our sample 
most companies have been publicly funded by the Federal State within programmes or 
initiatives (63 %). If we just focus on these publicly funded R&D collaborating firms, we 
observe a slightly higher tendency in the heterogeneous SBCOP: 65 per cent of these firms 
have R&D co-operations with science and industry, 27 per cent cooperate only with science 
and eight per cent of all firms only have business R&D partnerships. 
                                                 
11 (I) Significance and contribution of the respective publicly funded R&D project; (II) Impact of the publicly 
funded R&D project on collaborations; (III) General strategies underlying the acquisition and conduct of firms’ 
R&D projects, and (IV) General questions about R&D activities in the considered firm. See Fier et al. (2005) for 
further details on the questionnaire. 
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics of the German Survey (659 observations) 
Variables   Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
FUND Recipients of public R&D funding FUND=1 0.625 0.484 0 1 
BCOP R&D collaboration only with other business BCOP=1 0.188 0.391 0 1 
SCOP R&D collaboration only with science SBCOP=1 0.238 0.426 0 1 
SBCOP R&D collaboration with science and other business SBCOP=1 0.573 0.495 0 1 
ln(TURN) Log of turnover  2.945 1.967 -2.973 7.616 
ln(AGE) Log of firm’s age  2.945 1.043 0 5.425 
EXINT Export intensity  0.334 0.262 0 1 
RDNO No R&D activities RDNO=1 0.049 0.215 0 1 
RDOC Occasional R&D activities RDOC=1 0.158 0.365 0 1 
RDRE Regular R&D activities RDRE=1 0.793 0.405 0 1 
PATDL Patent dummy (lagged variable) PATDL=1 0.200 0.401 0 1 
EAST Eastern Germany EAST=1 0.319 0.466 0 1 
YR Year 2003 (base year: 2000) YR=1 0.581 0.494 0 1 
IND1 NACE Codes: 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 26, 40, 41, 45 IND1=1 0.085 0.280 0 1 
IND2 NACE Codes: 15, 61, 17 ,18, 19 IND2=1 0.039 0.195 0 1 
IND3 NACE Codes: 20, 21, 22, 36, 37 IND3=1 0.044 0.205 0 1 
IND4 NACE Codes: 23, 24, 25 IND4=1 0.159 0.365 0 1 
IND5 NACE Codes: 27, 28, 29, 34, 35 IND5=1 0.382 0.486 0 1 
IND6 NACE Codes: 30, 31, 32 IND6=1 0.112 0.316 0 1 
IND7 NACE Codes: 33 IND7=1 0.179 0.384 0 1 
SCOPC* R&D collaboration with science continued SCOPC=1 0.718 0.451 0 1 
BCOPC* R&D collaboration with business continued BCOPC=1 0.746 0.437 0 1 
SCOPI* R&D collaboration with science new initiated SCOPI=1 0.430 0.497 0 1 
BCOPI* R&D collaboration with business new initiated BCOPI=1 0.634 0.483 0 1 
BEGIN* Accelerated beginning of project BEGIN=1 0.542 0.500 0 1 
EXT* Extended project scope EXT=1 0.556 0.499 0 1 
ln(GRANT)* Log of funding amount    11.990 0.930 9.358 14.803 
ln(TURN)* Log of turnover  1.558 2.048 -2.017 7.093 
EAST* Eastern Germany  EAST=1 0.394 0.490 0 1 
SERVICE* Service sector SERVICE=1 0.338 0.475 0 1 
TEC1* Environment; Energy; Transportation TEC1=1 0.268 0.444 0 1 
TEC2* Materials TEC2=1 0.155 0.363 0 1 
TEC3* Life Science TEC3=1 0.077 0.268 0 1 
TEC4* ICT TEC4=1 0.338 0.475 0 1 
TEC5* Cross-Sectoral Activities; Education/Science TEC5=1 0.162 0.370 0 1 
Note: *N=142 collaborating & publicly funded firms involved in the CATI survey  
Source: ZEW Databases (2005) 
In the analysis we take several characteristics of R&D collaborating firms into account 
as exogenous variables. Since larger companies have a higher probability of co-operating in 
general and therefore tend to have more experience of co-operation, it is probable that they 
already maintain or have previously maintained co-operations with their possible partners 
(Fritsch/Lukas 2001). For this reason, we control for firm size in terms of the log of turnover, 
whereby turnover is measured in millions of euros (TURN). Firm’s experiences on markets 
and with competitors are controlled by their age (AGE, in logarithm). Companies differing in 
the regularity of their R&D activities might be heterogeneous with respect to their R&D 
organisation and thus might select a different set of partners. In order to capture this, we use 
three dummy variables: measuring whether firms exhibit no (RDNO), occasional (RDOC) or 
regular R&D (RDRE) activities. Regular R&D activities of firms might have a different 
influence on their choice of the co-operation partner.12 RDNO serves as base category. 
Further variables are used to control for intellectual property rights and firms’ experiences in 
                                                 
12 Cassiman/Veugelers (2002) found a positive effect of permanent R&D on co-operation with suppliers and 
customers, and a negative one on co-operations with research institutions, although both effects are not 
significant. 
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foreign markets. A lagged patent dummy (PATDL) is used to capture a firm’s appropriability 
capabilities and the export intensity (EXINT) indicates the degree of foreign sales. The lagged 
patent dummy variable represents the firm’s ability to appropriate the gains from conducted 
R&D, insufficient protection mechanisms for their own R&D results might prevent the firms 
from performing joint research with other businesses, in particular with competitors 
(Katz/Ordover 1990). We include the export intensity results due to the fact that firms who 
face international competition are more likely to conduct R&D and thus participate in specific 
R&D partnerships. All regressions include a dummy which denotes eastern German firms, as 
they may face different conditions due to the ongoing transformation process of the eastern 
German economy (EAST). We also include a dummy variable indicating the year of 
observation (YR2003; base year: 2000) and industry variables (IND1-IND7)13 to take into 
account distinctive features in different industries. 
Within the CATI survey, 142 publicly funded R&D collaborating firms reported on 
internal R&D activities, explained the effects of the participation in public R&D programmes 
and gave more information about their collaborations. Through the telephone survey, 
additional information becomes available to complement the MIP survey data. This 
information is used to test the second hypothesis, whether newly initiated business or science 
collaborations within a publicly funded R&D project are continued after the funding ends. 
Thereby, the continuation of collaboration need not be restricted to the funded project. The 
companies could also continue joint activity in another project. We distinguish two kinds of 
partnerships which have been continued after funding ended: 
(i) Business-Business co-operation continued (BCOPC): a firm’s R&D collaboration with 
other businesses continues after the funding period has ended, 
(ii) Business-Science co-operation continued (SCOPC): a firm’s R&D collaboration with 
science continues after the funding period has ended. 
Overall, almost 75 per cent of the co-operations are continued after the funding has 
ended. For firms which initiate new co-operation with business or science in the publicly 
funded R&D project, the dummy variables BCOPI and SCOPI are generated. Looking at the 
newly initiated co-operations with other businesses, 72 per cent of these were continued after 
funding had ended. In comparison, this percentage equals 79 if the collaborations that already 
existed are considered. This difference increases for co-operations with scientific institutions. 
Only 54 per cent of newly initiated collaborations are continued, compared to 85 per cent of 
those already established. If the funding has a longer term effect on collaboration, the newly 
initiated co-operations should have a higher or at least the same probability of being 
continued after funding ends compared to co-operations which already existed before funding, 
while controlling for other factors. Furthermore, we include two dummy variables in order to 
measure the effect of the funding which might be also linked to co-operation in general. The 
dummy variable BEGIN indicates whether the funding of an R&D project accelerated the 
beginning of the project. An extended project scope due to funding is captured by the dummy 
variable EXT. Both are expected to have a positive impact on the decision to continue co-
operation. The scope of the funded collaboration project, measured by the total amount of the 
received subsidies in the funded project (GRANT, in millions of euros), may have an impact 
                                                 
13 The overview of the aggregated industries is shown in the appendix, Table 5. 
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on these decisions. We capture impacts specific to a particular funding area by including five 
technology dummies (TEC1-TEC5).14 The reference category consists of projects belonging 
to cross-sectoral activities or education/science (TEC5). Moreover, firm-specific 
characteristics are included. We control for the size of the firm with the logarithm of turnover 
(TURN). Firms which are active in the service sector are labelled by the dummy variable 
SERVICE. The base category is the manufacturing sector. We include the dummy EAST 
indicating that the location of the firm is in eastern Germany.  
6 Empirical results 
(a) Changes of firms’ R&D partnerships due to public funding 
We perform a matching estimation to correct for a possible selection bias comparing 
publicly funded R&D collaborating companies and those not publicly funded. We investigate 
whether non-publicly funded firms collaborate in R&D with a different set of partners (firms 
from business, science or both) compared to the counterfactual situation, i.e., to the situation 
if these firms had been publicly funded.  
Given the broad range of variables in our dataset we are confident that we have 
enough information on the firms to sufficiently approximate the decision-making process 
regarding the funding (treatment) and co-operation partner (outcome) so that the CIA holds.  
Before proceeding the actual matching, a probit model on the probability of receiving 
funding (FUND) was estimated.15 The results show that the size of the firm has an inverted U-
shaped impact. The probability of a firm being publicly funded is higher if R&D activities are 
carried out regularly or occasionally. Firms which already had patents in the previous year 
have a higher probability of participation. Regarding the export behaviour no effect is found. 
A selectivity of funding towards younger firms is detected. Firms based in East-Germany 
have a higher probability of receiving funds than those located in the western part.  
The propensity score of this estimation is labelled PSCORE. In order to find a control 
observation for each treated firm, the nearest neighbour approach with replacement based on 
the mahalanobis distance is applied. Besides PSCORE the Mahalanobis metric restriction is 
defined by size (TURN), the lagged patent application dummy (PATDL), the regularity of 
R&D activities (RDNO, RDOC, RDRE), the age (ln(AGE)), industry group dummies (IND1-
IND7), and the region (EAST).  
To ensure that common support for the treated firms is fulfilled in the matching, 13 
treated observations had to be dropped, representing three per cent of all funded firms. But by 
means of a t-Test it can be shown that this drop does not lead to any significant change in the 
means of the considered variables. Therefore, the loss of the 13 observations can be 
neglected. 
                                                 
14 The funding areas are aggregated as follows: environment/energy, materials; life science, cross-sectoral 
activities/education/science. The detailed aggregation can be seen in the appendix, Table 6. 
15 The results of the probit estimation can be found in the appendix, Table 7. The matching procedure is 
described in detail, e.g., by Czarnitzki /Fier (2002).  
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In order to evaluate the quality of the matching we re-estimate the propensity score by 
using only the matched sample and taking account of replacement in the control group by 
weighting. As stated by Sianesi (2004) the pseudo-R2 after matching should be quite low 
because there should be no more systematic differences in the regressors between treated and 
control companies. In our setting, the Pseudo-R2 after the re-estimation is fairly low and 
equals 0.0173. Furthermore, a likelihood ratio suggests that there is no joint significance of all 
covariates of the probit model after matching.   
Table 3 illustrates the differences between the two groups, R&D collaborating and 
publicly funded firms as the treatment group and R&D collaborating but not publicly funded 
firms as the control group, showing the considered characteristics and the outcome variables 
before and after matching.  
Table 3: Matching results on R&D collaborating firms (399 matched pairs) 
   Mean Variable a) Sample 
publicly funded not publicly funded 
p-value of two sided 
t-test b) 
FUND Before matching 1 0  
 After matching 1 0  
PSCORE Before matching 0.703 0.498 0.000 
 After matching 0.694 0.662 0.220 
ln(TURN) Before matching 2.641 3.451 0.000 
 After matching 2.753 2.770 0.947 
ln(AGE) Before matching 2.753 3.272 0.000 
 After matching 2.777 2.955 0.185 
EXINT Before matching 0.331 0.340 0.688 
 After matching 0.335 0.337 0.940 
RDNO Before matching 0.019 0.097 0.000 
 After matching 0.020 0.020 1.000 
RDOC Before matching 0.124 0.215 0.002 
 After matching 0.129 0.129 1.000 
RDRE Before matching 0.857 0.688 0.000 
 After matching 0.852 0.852 1.000 
PATDL Before matching 0.206 0.190 0.619 
 After matching 0.211 0.180 0.593 
EAST Before matching 0.422 0.146 0.000 
 After matching 0.404 0.323 0.240 
BCOP Before matching 0.083 0.364 0.000 
 After matching 0.080 0.356 0.000 
SCOP Before matching 0.267 0.190 0.025 
 After matching 0.263 0.148 0.030 
SBCOP Before matching 0.650 0.445 0.000 
 After matching 0.657 0.496 0.026 
a) Eight industry dummies and a dummy variable indicating the year of the survey are not reported. But after matching the 
respective means are not significantly different. 
b) After matching, standard errors of t-statistics for two sided t-test on mean equality are based on the approximation by 
Lechner (2001) which accounts for sampling with replacement in the selected control group. 
Note: 13 treated observations had to be dropped due to common support. 
Looking at the t-Test conducted prior to the matching procedure, several variables 
differ in their distribution between the funded firms and the matched control group. However, 
the matching estimator is successful in balancing out these differences. After matching, these 
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differences vanish. Hence, it is possible to estimate the causal effect of public funding on the 
recipients.  
On the question of how publicly funded firms on average would have behaved if they 
had not been publicly funded, we find that R&D funding is, in particular, a tool that 
stimulates the inclusion of science in R&D partnerships. The proportion of companies which 
cooperate in R&D solely with industry, such as clients and/or suppliers (BCOP), is fairly low 
for funded firms. As a result of public funding, firms change their R&D strategy away from 
only business-to-business co-operation: Only 8 per cent of the funded firms cooperate in 
purely business-to-business relationships, while 36 per cent of firms would have chosen this 
partnership if they did not receive public funds.  
Firms which exclusively cooperate in R&D with science show a significant increase in 
their co-operation behaviour due to public funding (SCOP): 26 per cent of publicly funded 
firms cooperate solely with science and this share would have been lowered to 15 per cent if 
public funding had not taken place. But the highest rise is observed for the formation of more 
heterogeneous co-operations. The results show that 50 per cent of the publicly funded firms 
would have cooperated in R&D with science and industry if public funding had not taken 
place. This share increased up to 66 per cent due to funding.  
Overall, we find evidence that public funding has a significant influence on the 
selection of collaboration partners. Instead of business-to-business R&D partnerships, 
collaborating firms decide in favour of science-business and science only partnerships due to 
public funding, i.e., involving science partners as new members in their R&D collaborations. 
In the vast majority of cases, multidisciplinary R&D networks, i.e. co-operations with both 
other businesses and science, are established. 
Since in our study the treatment group is larger than the control group, we also 
estimate the average treatment effect on the untreated (ATU) in order to validate the results: 
the effect of public funding in terms of the co-operation partner for the non-funded firms. The 
estimates of ATU are in line with the ATT and suggest that the share of co-operations with 
other businesses only would decrease markedly and instead, multidisciplinary co-operations 
would be favoured (cf. Table 8 in appendix). 
 (b) Continuation of firms’ new R&D partnerships after public funding has ended 
We investigate collaboration behaviour when public funding has ended. This analysis 
is based on the group of publicly funded and R&D collaborating companies which 
participated in the CATI survey. In order to test which determinants influence the probability 
of continuing collaborations when the public R&D project funding has ended, we distinguish 
between co-operations with science and business. In the bivariate probit model the 
endogenous variables are dummy variables indicating whether the collaboration with science 
(SCOPC) and the collaboration with business (BCOPC) were continued. Table 4 shows the 
results of the regression model.  
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Table 4: Bivariate probit estimation results on continued collaborations 
 Collaboration with science continued 
(SCOPC) 
Collaboration with industry continued 
(BCOPC) 
Variables 
coeff. 
(std. err.) 
marg. eff. 
(std. err.) 
coeff. 
(std. err.) 
marg. eff. 
(std. err.) 
ln(GRANT) 0.309  (0.146) 
** 0.092 
(0.043)
** 0.082 
(0.136)
 0.014  
(0.023) 
 
SCOPI -1.107  (0.225) 
*** -0.338 
(0.071)
*** -  -  
BCOPI -  -  -0.417 (0.265)
 -0.065  
(0.038) 
* 
BEGIN 0.294  (0.251) 
 0.088 
(0.076)
 0.900 
(0.266)
*** 0.161  
(0.049) 
*** 
EXT 0.817  (0.253) 
*** 0.247 
(0.078)
*** 0.081 
(0.269)
 0.014  
(0.045) 
 
ln(TURN) 0.086  (0.079) 
 0.025 
(0.023)
 0.114 
(0.080)
 0.019  
(0.013) 
 
EAST 0.650  (0.305) 
** 0.181 
(0.080)
** 0.237 
(0.310)
 0.038  
(0.049) 
 
SERVICE 0.239  (0.325) 
 0.069 
(0.090)
 0.373 
(0.341)
 0.058  
(0.048) 
 
TEC1 0.114  (0.469) 
 0.033 
(0.133)
 -0.966 
(0.490)
** -0.213  
(0.133) 
 
TEC2 -0.300  (0.485) 
 -0.095 
(0.164)
 -1.236 
(0.500)
** -1.326  
(0.171) 
* 
TEC3 -0.114  (0.580) 
 -0.035 
(0.184)
 6.681 
(0.555)
*** 0.211  
(0.040) 
*** 
TEC4 0.244  (0.448) 
 0.070 
(0.125)
 -1.052 
(0483)
** -0.219  
(0120) 
* 
RHO 0.593 *** (0.132)     
Number of obs.  142 
Note: Significant at the 1%-level (***), 5%-level (**), 10%-level (*) 
 Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are presented. 
Marginal effect (at the sample means) for the probability of continuing the collaborations with science, 
unconditional on the continuance of collaboration with industry; and vice versa. For dummy variables, 
the marginal effect represents the discrete change from 0 to 1. 
The results show the likelihood of continuing the corresponding collaboration is 
higher if the companies gain specific experiences through the funding. Some firms broadened 
their initial research spectrum due to public funding (EXT). This extension of the R&D 
project volume has a positive influence on the continuation of collaborations with science. A 
positive effect of the extension of the project volume does not apply for co-operation with 
business. Due to the funding, about half of the firms were able to expedite the beginning of 
the project since potential financial gaps and negotiations were reduced. With regard to 
business-business co-operations, a faster initial project start (BEGIN) increases the likelihood 
of continuing the collaboration with business partners. This observation could be explained by 
the fact that firms were able to realise a comparative advantage over competitors because of 
the earlier project start. In order to maintain this advantage, the business-business partnership 
is more likely to be continued.  
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We find that the total amount of R&D funds awarded (ln(GRANT)) has a significantly 
positive effect on the probability of continuing collaboration with scientific institutions. 
Large-scale R&D project grants tend to be more complex, which has two effects. Firstly, it is 
sometimes not possible to keep to the scheduled end-date and the collaborative project has to 
be continued. Secondly, additional research topics emerge due to the complexity, as argued 
above. The funding volume does not have an influence on continuing business-business 
collaboration after the funding has ended. 
A firm’s location in eastern Germany has a positive effect on the continuation of 
collaboration with science. Other firm characteristics like size (ln(TURN)) or belonging to the 
service sector (SERVICE) do not affect the probability of continuation of any type of co-
operation. Overall, it seems that firm characteristics do not play a crucial role for the 
continuation of collaboration, only for the decision to cooperate at all and with whom.  
As seen in the descriptive statistics, a proportion of the newly initiated co-operations 
are continued after funding has ended. In order to evaluate its significance we compare these 
with the already existing co-operations and check if a newly initiated co-operation is at least 
as likely to be continued as a funded co-operation which already existed before funding, while 
controlling for other factors which might influence the decision whether to continue a 
collaboration. Regarding hypothesis two, we find that co-operations with scientific 
institutions which were newly initiated for the funded project are less likely to be continued 
after funding has ended than co-operations which already existed prior to the funded project 
(SCOPI). The probability of the continuation with science decreases by approximately 34 
percentage points if the co-operation is newly initiated. Long-term partnerships might mean 
co-operation on a more trustful basis, not involving such high risks as co-operation with new 
partners. This, in turn, may make continuation more plausible. A newly initiated co-operation 
may not be able to achieve or outweigh this effect. Overall, public funding tends to integrate 
science into business R&D partnerships, but the newly established networks are not 
necessarily lasting after funding has ended. 
While the effect of newly initiated co-operations is highly significantly negative 
regarding the continuation of co-operations with science, it is weakly significant regarding the 
continuation of co-operation with business (BCOPI) and the change in probability is much 
smaller. The probability of the continuation with industry decreases by 6 percentage points if 
the co-operation is newly initiated.16 For the continuation of a co-operation it does not matter 
significantly whether it was newly initiated for the project or whether it already existed before 
funding began. If the government achieves its aim of assuring that a new co-operation with 
another business is established for the funded project, the probability of continuing this co-
operation is almost as high as it is for already existing ones. Therefore, the achieved funding 
has a longer term effect in this respect. 
                                                 
16 The marginal effect of SCOPI is significant on the 10% level. Looking at the coefficient of SCOPI, the 
significance vanishes. 
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7 Conclusions 
Public funding of R&D activities has become an integral function of innovation 
policies in many OECD countries. From a scientist’s as well as a policy maker’s point of 
view, understanding the mechanisms and impacts associated with these public interventions is 
of particular importance. Its increasing relevance can be ascribed to decreasing government 
budgets and the necessity to design policy measures more efficiently. In Germany, direct 
R&D project funding is an important funding tool used by the government. Since the end of 
the 1980s a clear trend towards the funding of projects conducted in networks rather than 
individual companies has emerged. In 2004 two-thirds of all direct funded projects were part 
of a collaborative network.  
This research study focuses on firms’ behaviour regarding co-operations in publicly 
funded R&D projects. We ask whether public R&D funding is adequate for influencing firms’ 
collaborative behaviour. More precisely, we investigate (i) whether public R&D funding 
stimulates firms to participate in new kinds of R&D co-operation (with business firms only, 
with science only or both) and (ii) whether newly initiated collaborations within a publicly 
funded R&D project are at least as likely to last as already existing co-operations, after public 
funding has ended. Our research is based on different databases and a telephone survey. For 
the first research question the sample consists of observations for 659 collaborating German 
firms, for the second question we have 142 observations.  
Overall, the results of our analyses vary depending on the type of the co-operation 
partner. Public funding is successful in integrating scientific institutions as a new type of 
partner in co-operations. Funded companies have more diversified co-operation networks. 
Publicly funded collaborative R&D is suitable for changing co-operative behaviour: Firms 
which had exclusively cooperated with other business companies involve science as a new 
partner in their R&D activities due to the funding. Hence, public funding achieves its aim of 
broadening R&D networks, in the government’s expectation of strengthening spillovers and 
innovativeness. 
Regarding the longer term, a proportion of the funded projects last after funding has 
ended. In order to evaluate this proportion we compare the newly initiated co-operations with 
those that already existed. The newly initiated co-operations with science have a higher 
probability of being broken up again after funding has ended compared to co-operations with 
science which already existed before funding was introduced. Hence, this change in firms’ co-
operation behaviour is more short-lived. On the other hand, the newly initiated co-operations 
with business, which might not be seen as a behavioural change in the co-operation strategy 
since it is not a new type of partner, have a longer term effect. This is demonstrated by the 
fact that they have at least the same probability of being continued as already existing 
business co-operations.  
A proportion of co-operations which were newly initiated with science are continued 
but the question is if this proportion is high enough to satisfy the government. If we compare 
the proportion with already existing co-operations the probability of continuation for newly 
initiated co-operations with science is lower, for new co-operations with other businesses it is 
almost as high as for already existing ones. 
This study is a first attempt to evaluate behavioural changes in a quantitative analysis. 
In doing so, it focuses on the collaborative aspect, which is only one form of the behavioural 
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additionality concept. Unfortunately, our number of observations is rather small, so it would 
be helpful to verify the results using a larger dataset. But if the results were confirmed, the 
question would arise as to whether the government is satisfied with the long term effect on co-
operation behaviour. However, this is only one goal of R&D policy. Other objectives are 
achieved as shown in other studies, like input additionality, i.e. firms increase their innovation 
expenditures due to public direct R&D funding. In order to obtain a long term effect on co-
operation behaviour another tool might prove more successful. 
Furthermore, for the first research question, it would be helpful to have more detailed 
information on the specific co-operations like the size of the co-operation. We know the types 
of co-operation partners but not, for instance, the numbers of involved partners. In the second 
analysis, other measures could be discussed in order to evaluate the success of the funding 
with respect to the achievement of a longer-term behavioural change.  
Public funding might also induce changes in other behavioural terms, like the 
management of R&D. It would be interesting to extend the evaluation to other behavioural 
aspects. 
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Appendix 
Table 5: Industries used and regression aggregates 
Industry NACE 
Rev. 1 
Description 
IND1 10 
11 
 
12 
13 
14 
26 
40 
41 
45 
Mining of coal and lignite; extraction of peat 
Extraction of crude petroleum and natural gas; service activities incidental to oil and gas 
extraction excluding surveying 
Mining of uranium and thorium ores 
Mining of metal ores 
Other mining and quarrying 
Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products 
Electricity, gas, steam and hot water supply 
Collection, purification and distribution of water 
Construction 
IND2 15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
Manufacture of food products and beverages 
Manufacture of tobacco products 
Manufacture of textiles 
Manufacture of wearing apparel; dressing and dyeing of fur 
Tanning and dressing of leather; manufacture of luggage, handbags, saddlery, harness and 
footwear 
IND3 20 
 
21 
22 
36 
37 
Manufacture of wood and of products of wood and cork, except furniture; manufacture of 
articles of straw and plaiting materials 
Manufacture of pulp, paper and paper products 
Publishing, printing and reproduction of recorded media 
Manufacture of furniture; manufacturing n.e.c. 
Recycling 
IND4 23 
24 
25 
Manufacture of coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel 
Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products 
Manufacture of rubber and plastic products 
IND5 27 
28 
29 
34 
35 
Manufacture of basic metals 
Manufacture of fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment 
Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c. 
Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 
Manufacture of other transport equipment 
IND6 30 
31 
32 
Manufacture of office machinery and computers 
Manufacture of electrical machinery and apparatus n.e.c. 
Manufacture of radio, television and communication equipment and apparatus 
IND7 33 Manufacture of medical, precision and optical instruments, watches and clocks 
 
Table 6: Aggregates of funding areas 
Aggregated funding area Funding area 
TEC1 Environment/energy/ C1 Marine and polar search 
 transportation C2 Marine technology 
  D1 National funding of space research and space technology 
  E4 Decommissioning of nuclear facilities; risk sharing 
  F1 Socio-ecological research; regional sustainability 
  F2 Sustainable production; cleaner environmental technology 
  F7 Global change (including peace-building research) 
  N0 Research and technology for mobility and transport (including traffic 
safety) 
  O1 Geosciences (especially deep drillings) 
  O2 Raw material supplies 
26 
TEC2 Materials L1 Materials research; materials for emerging technologies 
  L2 Physical and chemical technologies 
  P2 Buildings; R&D for preserving the architectural heritage; road building 
R&D 
TEC3 Life science G0 R&D in the health sector 
  H0 R&D to improve working conditions 
  K0 Biotechnology 
TEC4 ICT I1 Computer science 
  I2 Basic information technologies 
  I3 Application of microsystems (incl. application of microelectronics; 
microperipherals) 
  I4 Production engineering 
  I5 Multimedia 
TEC5 Cross-sectoral activities/ B0 Large-scale equipment for basic research 
 education/science S1 Vocational training research  
  S2 Other educational research 
  V0 Humanities; economics and social sciences 
  W1 Structural/innovative (generic) measures 
  W2 Other generic activities 
  Y2 Not R&D-relevant expenditures for vocational training – no science 
  Y3 Remaining not R&D-relevant expenditures for vocational training – no 
science 
 
Table 7: Probit estimation on being publicly funded (659 observations) 
Variables Coeff. Std. Err. 
ln(TURN) -0.254 *** 0.086 
ln(TURN)2 0.026 ** 0.013 
Ln(AGE) -0.120 ** 0.059 
EXINT 0.204  0.233 
RDOC 0.669 ** 0.287 
RDRE 1.200 *** 0.265 
PATDL 0.274 * 0.147 
EAST 0.807 *** 0.143 
YR 0.209 * 0.116 
IND2 -0.001  0.336 
IND3 -1.170 *** 0.331 
IND4 -0.484 ** 0.238 
IND5 -0.033  0.216 
IND6 -0.220  0.253 
IND7 -0.132  0.244 
CONSTANT -0.204  0.375 
Log-Likelihood -361.799  
Pseudo R-squared 0.170  
Note: Significant at the 1%-level (***), 5%-level (**), 10%-level (*) 
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Table 8: Estimated average treatment effect on the untreated R&D collaborating firms 
(245 matched pairs) 
   Mean Variable a) Sample 
not publicly funded publicly funded 
p-value of two 
sided t-test b) 
FUND Before matching 0 1  
 After matching 0 1  
PSCORE Before matching 0.502 0.297 0.000 
 After matching 0.498 0.485 0.604 
Ln(TURN) Before matching 3.451 2.641 0.000 
 After matching 3.450 3.305 0.506 
Ln(AGE) Before matching 3.272 2.753 0.000 
 After matching 3.266 3.339 0.576 
EXINT Before matching 0.340 0.331 0.688 
 After matching 0.340 0.363 0.463 
RDNO Before matching 0.097 0.019 0.000 
 After matching 0.090 0.069 0.542 
RDOC Before matching 0.215 0.124 0.002 
 After matching 0.216 0.212 0.938 
RDRE Before matching 0.688 0.857 0.000 
 After matching 0.694 0.718 0.672 
PATDL Before matching 0.190 0.206 0.619 
 After matching 0.192 0.180 0.804 
EAST Before matching 0.146 0.422 0.000 
 After matching 0.147 0.143 0.927 
BCOP Before matching 0.364 0.083 0.000 
 After matching 0.359 0.135 0.000 
SCOP Before matching 0.190 0.267 0.025 
 After matching 0.192 0.196 0.936 
SBCOP Before matching 0.445 0.650 0.000 
 After matching 0.449 0.669 0.000 
a) Eight industry dummies and a dummy variable indicating the year of the survey are not reported. But after matching the 
respective means are not significantly different. 
b) Standard errors of t-statistics for two sided t-test on mean equality are based on the approximation by Lechner (2001) 
which accounts for sampling with replacement in the selected control group.  
Note: 2 treated observations had to be dropped due to common support. 
 
